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I. INTRODUCTION
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) creates a substantial
liability for corporations and a potential windfall for civil RICO plaintiffs.1 Violations carry
treble damages plus attorney’s fees and costs.2 For that reason, “[c]ivil RICO is an unusually
potent weapon–the litigation equivalent of a thermonuclear device.”3 Because of this threat, civil
RICO actions frequently settle if the suit moves beyond dispositive motions. Indeed, the “very
pendency of a RICO suit can be stigmatizing and its consummation can be costly.”4 Therefore
courts “strive to flush out frivolous RICO allegations” at an early stage of the litigation.5
Courts look with particularity to assure plaintiffs have sufficient RICO standing, as there
is severe hardship to defendants should improper civil RICO suit continue beyond the early
stages of litigation.6 Civil RICO has arguably been over-utilized because of its lucrative
remedy,7 relatively low initial costs,8 and many statutory ambiguities.9 These qualities
transformed the statute into an attractive option for private parties injured as a result of another’s
illicit practices.10 Since its beginning, civil RICO’s vague boundaries permit its use in
unconventional ways, which has recently led to a unilateral attempt by the United States
Supreme Court to restrict its far reaching potential.11 This is so even where Congress may have
intended to expand the racketeering statute to promote private enforcement of unlawful schemes,
thus filling gaps of law enforcement capabilities.12

1

See 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 1961 et seq.
See id.; see also Micah King, RICO: A New Tool for Immigration Law Enforcement, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION
STUD. (Aug. 2003), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2003/back1103.pdf (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq.)
(“Additionally, the court can order the defendant to divest itself of any interest in any enterprise and to refrain from
engaging in any commercial activity or making commercial investment.”).
3
Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F. 2d 44 (1st Cir. 1991).
4
Id.
5
Katzman v. Victoria’s Secret Catalogue, 167 F.R.D. 649, 655 (quoting Figueroa Ruiz v. Alegria, 896 F. 2d 645,
650 (1st Cir. 1990)).
6
See id. at 655.
7
See King, supra note 2.
8
See Jonathan Turley, The RICO Lottery and the Gains Multiplication Approach: An Alternative Measurement of
Damages Under Civil RICO, 33 VILLANOVA L. REV. 239, 254 (1988) (stating that civil RICO litigation costs are
small compared to its lucrative remedy that is set “at a sum great enough to ruin, or at least cripple, a racketeering
business”).
9
See generally Michael Goldsmith, Resurrecting RICO: Removing Immunity for White-Collar Crime, 41 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 281, 289 (2004).
10
See Patrick D. Hughes, The Investment Injury Requirement in Civil RICO Section 1962(a) Actions, 41 DEPAUL L.
REV. 475, 483-85 (1992) (stating that RICO was ‘designed to deal with organized crime, but it also was crafted more
broadly to deal with all forms of enterprise criminality’) (quoting Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of
the Myths that Bolster Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposals for Reform: Mother of God, Is This the
End of RICO?, 43 VAND. L. REV. 851, 860 (1990)).
11
See id.
12
See Raymond J. Dowd, Civil RICO Misread: The Judicial Repeal of the 1988 Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 14 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 946, 978-79 (1990/1991) (“Congress created civil RICO and its treble
damages award as a supplement to enlist private resources in its domestic war on organized crime, a war that
Congress believed public prosecutorial resources were insufficient to handle.”).
2

2

It is only those who abuse civil RICO’s broad application that should be limited,
however, from RICO’s expansive reach. Arguably, civil RICO was an effective tool to fight
organized crime in the United States as well as those who profit and benefit from illicit activities.
Although a civil RICO plaintiff may constitute a “broad” class of individual or corporation, the
expansive requirements of assuring the defendant properly fall under the statute’s scope provides
protection from unnecessary civil RICO claims.
Civil RICO has provided a remedy to those directly affected by individuals or
corporations that commit such crimes as systematic fraudulent schemes or violate provisions of
the INA by hiring undocumented workers to gain an unlawful advantage. At the very least,
Congress utilizes civil RICO as an useful tool in fighting crime by continually amending civil
RICO’s ‘predicate offenses’ that reach beyond the resources of law enforcement agencies.
Therefore, when the Supreme Court applies a judicially created limitation to the standing
requirements of civil RICO, as it has done in 2006, the Court has likely done so against the
congressional intent of the statute. The Supreme Court should take a ‘plain language’
interpretation of the statute to permit holding those responsible.
In light of these competing theories of the statute, this comment analyzes a heavily
litigated issue since civil RICO’s enactment–its unclear statutory scope and private party
standing.13 To illustrate this issue, this comment explores recent RICO litigation related to the
unlawful hiring of undocumented workers as an example of a congressionally supported
application of civil RICO, but in a manner wholly unrelated to organized crime or the mafia.14
While the Supreme Court has limited civil RICO’s outer boundaries, Congress seems to go the
opposite direction by continually expanding the statute’s application.
Part II.A and Part II.B outline RICO’s history and early development, illustrating a
remarkable transformation from its initial purpose to modern application. Part III.A and Part
III.B then analyze the success of civil RICO in recent cases that address allegations unrelated to
organized crime. Specifically, Part III.B examines allegations against corporations that
knowingly and systematically hire undocumented immigrants to gain economic advantages over
their competitors, depress wages of their lawfully employed workforce, and “harbor” their
undocumented employees from law enforcement agencies.
Section Part III.C provides a detailed analysis of two recent Supreme Court civil RICO
decisions that have seemingly attempted to restrict this broad RICO application. In Anza v. Ideal
Steel Supply (“Anza”),15 the Court showed implicit concern with civil RICO’s far-reaching
potential and adverse economic impact. Consequently, the Supreme Court expanded an already
13

See John L. Koenig, What Have They Done to Civil RICO: The Supreme Court Takes the Racketeering
Requirement Out of Racketeering, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 857 (1986) (stating that district courts “had imposed a
number of different standing limitations on private civil RICO actions”); Stephen Scallan, Proximate Cause Under
RICO, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 455, 495 (1996) (noting the different interpretations courts have applied for civil RICO
standing); Patrick Wackerly, Personal Versus Property Harm and Civil RICO Standing, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513,
1527 (2006) (noting the difficulties in applying a uniform civil RICO standing test).
14
See generally Commercial Cleaning Servs. v. Colin Serv. Systems, Inc., 271 F. 3d 374 (2001); Mendoza v. Zirkle
Fruit Co., 301 F. 3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2002); Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 370 F. 3d 602 (6th Cir. 2004); Zavala v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D.N.J. 2005).
15
Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1991 (June 5, 2006).
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narrow “direct proximate cause” requirement first set forth in Holmes v. Securities Investor
Protection Corp. (“Holmes”) to further limit access to the statute.16
Anza thus further restricts civil RICO standing even where Congress has, for decades,
expanded the statute. For example, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, RICO was unpopularity
used “in various types of labor-management disputes, including strike and union litigation.”17 In
1996, Congress expanded RICO’s predicate offenses to include violations of section 274 of the
INA.18 These 1996 amendments brought immigration law violations, together with labor and
employment law, into the statutory scope of civil RICO lawsuits.19 Thus, even legitimate
corporations that have no connection to organized crime but nonetheless knowingly employed
undocumented workers or even encourage illegal immigration, are liable to other employees,
competitors, or undocumented workers for their participation in their unlawful hiring schemes.20
Therefore, as discussed in detail infra, the Supreme Court’s recent civil RICO decisions
restrict its statutory scope to only the ‘most’ directly affected by the unlawful practices (e.g., law
enforcement agencies). If this is correct, it goes directly against congressional intent of civil
RICO. Because RICO carries a broad statutory mandate that favors an expansive scope,21
private enforcement of civil RICO due to violations of immigration law presents “an innovative
method for tightening borders, [although] its economic impact on [corporations] in the United
States may be harmful.”22 Congressional expansion of RICO, in adding INA violations as
predicate offenses, illustrates that “[t]he use of RICO as an immigration enforcement tool is
consistent with Congress’ intent to provide a remedy to businesses suffering harm from illegal
competition.”23 Therefore, “there is little doubt that such suits can provide adequate remedies for
businesses and employees” who are injured by the illicit practices of their competitors.24
II. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE RACKETEERING INFLUENCED
ORGANIZATIONS ACT (RICO)

AND

CORRUPT

A. Civil RICO’s Enactment
RICO was enacted by Congress as part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 “in
response to public outcry and several government studies revealing pervasive infiltration of the
legitimate business community by the mafia and other organized crime syndicates.”25 The
enactment of RICO was to empower federal prosecutors the powers to enforce criminal penalties
16

Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992).
Elisabeth J. Sweeney Yu, Addressing the Economic Impact of Undocumented Immigration on the American
Worker: Private RICO Litigation and Public Policy, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 909, 936 (2006).
18
This was codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1324; see discussion infra Part II.B.
19
See 8 U.S.C. § 1324.
20
See King, supra note 2 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 - 1968).
21
United States v. Pepe, 747 F.2d 632, 659 (11th Cir. 1984).
22
Adam J. Homicz, Private Enforcement of Immigration Law: Expanded Definitions Under RICO and the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 38 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 621, 623 (2005).
23
Id. at 637 (citing Teresa Bryan et al., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
987, 989 (2003)).
24
Homicz, supra note 22, at 638 (citing Micah King, supra note 2).
25
Daniel Z. Herbst, Injunctive Relief and Civil RICO: After Scheidler v. National Org. for Women, Inc., RICO’s
Scope and Remedies Require Reevaluation, 53 CATH U.L. REV. 1125 (2004).
17
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and civil equitable remedies against the mafia.26 By providing a civil RICO cause of action,
private individuals and corporations are also able to recover damages directly caused from the
“broad patterns of racketeering activities associated with organized crime.”27
RICO has always been applied broadly. Indeed, Congress charged that RICO should be
“liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.”28 RICO was part of an “aggressive
initiative to supplement old remedies and develop new methods for fighting crime.”29 After an
eightfold increase in civil RICO actions between 1983 and 1988,30 including more than one
thousand actions filed per year,31 district courts increasingly presided over civil RICO cases in
areas not typically associated with organized crime. Although there are many harsh critics
against the broad application of RICO because of its adverse potential economic impact, it is not
clear whether a broad application of this remedial statute is bad. Indeed, “RICOs ‘liberal
construction’ clause . . . seeks to ensure that Congress’ intent is not frustrated by an overly
narrow reading of the statute.”32
Even though RICO was endorsed because of “the perceived need to combat organized
crime . . . , [Congress] chose to enact a more general statute, one which . . . was not limited in
application to organized crime.33 Further, the Supreme Court has stated that although “RICO
may be a poorly drafted statute[,] rewriting it is a job for Congress . . . and not for this Court.
There is no more room in RICO's ‘self-consciously expansive language and overall approach’ for
the imposition of an organized crime limitation . . . .”34
Drafting a Constitutionally sound statute geared towards a group such the mafia proved
to be challenging.35 As a result, Congress “defined ‘racketeering activity’ by incorporating into
its definition numerous predicate offenses chargeable under state and federal law that had long
been associated with organized crime syndicates.”36 The original Senate RICO bill did not
include a civil action and remedy for private persons.37 Civil RICO was actually “eleventh-hour

26

Id. at 1126.
Id.
28
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. IMREX Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 528 (1985) (quoting Pub. L. 92-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947)
(Powell, J. dissenting).
29
Id. at 498.
30
Id. at 481 n.1.
31
William H. Rehnquist, Remarks of the Chief Justice, 21 ST. MARY’S L.J. 5, 9 (1989).
32
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 183 (1993).
33
H.J., Inc. v. NW Bell Telephone Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2905 (1989).
34
Id. at 2905 (citations omitted).
35
See Cecil Greek, Is This the End of RICO? Or Only the Beginning?, 19 FREE INQUIRY IN CREATIVE SOCIOLOGY 1
(May 1991).
36
Herbst, supra note 25, at 1130-31 (citing John L. Koenig, What Have They Done to Civil RICO: The Supreme
Court Takes the Racketeering Requirement Out of Racketeering, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 829 n.34 (1986)
(explaining that in defining racketeering activity, Congress created a “functional legal concept” rather than
attempting to define organized crime or attach a specific connection to it).
37
During hearings before the House Judiciary Committee, Representative Steiger proposed the addition of a private
treble-damages action and stated “[those] who have been wronged by organized crime should at least be given
access to a legal remedy.” The Committee approved the amendment. See S. No. 30, before Subcommittee No. 5,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
27
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addition”38 to encourage private parties in assisting with “the eradication of organized crime in
the United States.”39 “While RICO is designed to combat the infiltration into and corruption of
America’s legitimate business community by organized crime, it is only occasionally put to these
ends in civil cases today.”40 The remedy of treble damages as well as attorneys’ fees and costs
has drawn numerous plaintiffs who would have otherwise file state tort claims into federal
courts.41
Federal courts have struggled with the broad congressional mandate to broadly construe
RICO. It is arguably this liberal construction clause that allowed RICO’s application to first
expand beyond its initial intended scope.42 Although the Supreme Court has historically been
“overtly cautious so as not to overstep the boundaries of judicial review,”43 its recent decision in
Anza is a transparent attempt to restrict civil RICO’s private use beyond those harmed by
organized criminal activity. This is true even though it has been utilized such a manner for more
than two decades.
RICO defines racketeering activity as (1) any act “‘chargeable’ under several generically
described state criminal laws; (2) any act ‘indictable’ under numerous specific federal criminal
law provisions, including mail and wire fraud; (3) and any ‘offense’ involving narcotics or
bankruptcy or securities fraud ‘punishable’ under federal law.”44 The use of income derived
from a ‘pattern of racketeering activity’ in relation to an ‘enterprise’ engaged in or affecting
interstate commerce is explicitly prohibited by civil RICO.45 At least two actions of racketeering
activity constitute the requisite pattern of racketeering.46
To determine whether a plaintiff has statutory standing to bring a RICO claim, the
plaintiff must satisfy three pleading requirements: “(1) a violation of [a prohibited activity as
provided in] section 1962;47 (2) injury to business or property; and (3) causation of the injury by
the violation.”48 With regard to the aforementioned causation requirement, a RICO plaintiff
lacks standing absent a direct relationship between the injury alleged and the predicate RICO
offense.49 A critical limitation on this causation requirement, first purported in the Supreme

38

GREGORY P. JOSEPH, CIVIL RICO A DEFINITIVE GUIDE, ch. 1, § 2 (2000) (citing Kurzweil, Criminal & Civil
RICO: Traditional Canons of Statutory Interpretation and the Liberal Construction Clause, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 41, 60 (1996)).
39
Statement of Findings and Purpose, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N
1073.
40
JOSEPH, supra note 38 (citing Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. at 943 (1970)).
41
Rehnquist, supra note 31, at 9; see also Herbst, supra note 25, at 1134.
42
Herbst, supra note 25, at 1134.
43
Id.
44
Religious Tech. Ctr. & Church of Scientology Int’l, Inc. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 1986)
(citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1962).
45
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1965(5)).
46
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1964).
47
“A violation of § 1962(c) requires (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity
[and while] [t]he plaintiff must, of course, allege each of these elements to state a claim . . . the statute requires no
more than this.” See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496-97 (1985).
48
First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp. 27 F. 3d 763, 767 (2d Cir. 1994).
49
Id. at 769.
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Court decision of Holmes,50 is that a defendant’s RICO violation “was the “but-for” [cause] of
the [the plaintiff’s] injury,”51 in addition to the legal or proximate cause.52
B. Developments in Civil RICO Application
The purpose of civil RICO was “not merely to compensate victims, but to turn them into
prosecutors, or ‘private attorneys general,’ dedicated to eliminating racketeering activity.”53 The
unintended consequence of Congress’ broad construction clause provided “plaintiffs with an
avenue to bring actions in the federal courts against defendants who were not associated with
[the mafia or] organized crime.”
In United States v. Turkette, the Supreme Court found that RICO applies to legitimate
enterprises, including individuals or corporations.54 At issue in Turkette was the definition of the
term ‘enterprise’ as applied under RICO.55 Some lower courts had, up at this point, limited civil
RICO to criminal, illegitimate (or racketeering) enterprises.56 Now, “[g]iven the ruling in
Turkette, RICO could be used not only against the mafia and other criminal organizations, but
[also] . . . be used against corporations, political protest groups, [and] labor unions.”57 This early
interpretation by the Supreme Court was arguably the first time application of civil RICO went
beyond its initial legislative purpose.58
Because “the term ‘enterprise’ includes legitimate and illegitimate organizations [or
corporations], and given that a RICO claim can be based on violations of the [overbroad] mail or
wire fraud statutes . . . [and now violations of the INA],” RICO can be used in an unlimited
number of factual scenarios.59 Although a violation cannot exist in the absence of long-term
criminal activity, RICO’s favorable remedies and ambiguity have directed many legitimate state
claims into federal court.60
If a statute has drafting errors, which make it impermissively ambiguous, or courts have
stepped beyond their judicial bounds, Congress is clearly the proper branch to limit or clarify the
statute.61 In this case, however, Congress has not enacted any substantial restrictive amendments
50

Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992).
Gelt Funding Corp. 27 F. 3d at 769.
52
See id. Proximate cause is “an event sufficiently related to a legally recognizable injury to be held the cause of
that injury. See Proximate Cause, WIKIPEDIA (2007). Many courts, however, improperly define proximate cause as
the “but-for” test (i.e., but-for the rain, the car would not have crashed). Proximate cause is actually a limitation on
the “but-for” causation test because it requires that the action be “close enough to a harm in a chain of events to be a
legally culpable cause of the harm.” Id.
53
Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549 (2000); see also Attorney General of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings,
Inc., 268 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2001).
54
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 585 (1981) (“The aim [of civil RICO] is to divest the association of the
fruits of its ill-gotten gains.”).
55
See id.
56
See id.
57
See Ricoact.com, http://www.ricoact.com/ricoact/faq.asp (last visited Jan. 26, 2007) (RICO claims can be based
upon the activities of any group or organization whose members pursue a common goal).
58
Frequently Asked Questions RicoAct.com, http://www.ricoact.com/ricoact/faq.asp (last visited Jan. 26, 2007).
59
Id.
60
See RicoAct.com, http://www.ricoact.com/ricoact/index.asp (last visited Jan. 26, 2007).
61
See generally Amanda Frost, Certifying Questions to Congress, BERKELEY ELECTRONIC PRESS (2006)
51
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to change the statute. Only once, as part of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,
has Congress enacted a RICO amendment that could be viewed as limiting.62 The securities
litigation reform movement amended RICO to require that a defendant be criminally convicted
of securities fraud before the defendant was subject to a civil RICO claim, thus virtually
removing securities fraud as a predicate offense.63
At the time, Congress chose to limit civil RICO claims against securities fraud defendants
“because securities laws generally provide adequate remedies for those injured by securities
fraud, [and Congress believed] it [was] both unnecessary and unfair to expose defendants in
securities cases to the threat of treble damages and other extraordinary remedies provided by
RICO.”64 However, following the securities fraud purported through Enron’s practices, the 1995
securities fraud amendment to RICO has been widely criticized by some legal commentators
who have recommended that Congress repeal this restriction.65
In 1996, Congress further expanded RICO’s predicate offenses even though it was
unquestionably aware of federal courts’ twenty-year struggle in interpreting the statute. This
expansion of civil RICO promoted private assistance to the limited resources of U.S.
immigration law enforcement agencies that faced millions of undocumented residents working
illegally in the United States.66 Indeed, Congress signed three major pieces of legislation into
law in 1996 that affected all immigrants, including a sweeping reform to U.S. immigration
enforcement policies.67
RICO, as amended in 1996, added a violation of Section 274 of the INA68 to the list of
prohibited conduct qualifying as a predicate offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1961.69 This expanded
racketeering activity for purposes of RICO to include “any act which is indictable under the
[INA], section 274 (relating to bringing in and harboring certain aliens).”70 “In contrast, section
274A is entitled ‘Unlawful Employment of Aliens’ and qualifies several prohibitions on

62

See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995). This Securities
Litigation Reform Act was designed to curtail class action lawsuits by the plaintiffs bar. See Adam C. Pritchard,
Should Congress Repeal Securities Class Action Reform?, SOC. SCI. RESEARCH NETWORK (Mar. 2003),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=389561.
63
See Statement of the Honorable Orrin Hatch, U.S. Senator, S. Hearing, Feb. 6, 2002.
64
Id. (quoting former Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Arthur Levitt).
65
See e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 9, at 305 (“[T]he Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 stands as the
most formidable obstacle to Enron victims and others similarly situated. . . . Congress should repeal RICO’s
securities exemption. Further, this repeal should operate retroactively so that injured investors could sue for relief.
Retroactive application would be fully constitutional.”) (citation omitted).
66
Micah King, supra note 2 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 - 1968).
67
Immigration and Welfare Changes, 3 RURAL MIGRATION NEWS 4 (Oct. 1996), available at
http://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/more.php?id=155_0_4_0.
68
As codified in 8 U.S.C. 1324.
69
Homicz, supra note 22, at 623.
70
Id. at 629. The addition of INA violations to RICO was came within the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996. S. Rep. No. 104-179 (1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924. These amendments were
part of much broader legislation aimed at combating the economic and personal costs of rising crime in the United
States. See also id. at 629 (citing S. Rep. No. 104-179, at 17 (1995), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 930).
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employment of illegal aliens in the United States.”71 The new INA predicate offenses made it
unlawful to encourage illegal immigration or employ illegal immigrants.72 Although private
enforcement of the INA is prohibited, adding this predicate offense to RICO provided an outlet
for private immigration enforcement, albeit through indirect means. At the very least, it would
impact corporations that lowered their costs by systematically employing undocumented
immigrants.
It is entirely possible that Congress viewed illegal immigration as large a national issue as
organized crime in the late 1960s and 1970s. Illegal immigrants’ ease at finding employment in
the United States was (and still is) a large reason behind the surge of illegal immigration into the
United States.73 In 2006, it was estimated that there are more than twelve million undocumented
workers in the United States.74 Congress, by adding INA offenses to RICO, addressed a large,
national issue that necessitated resources far beyond those available to state and federal law
enforcement agencies. If the United States government is able to limit the employment of
undocumented workers, it is likely that the flow of illegal immigrants into this country would
subside.
Congress did not believe the mafia was involved in the employment of undocumented
workers, yet it decided to once again expand civil RICO. This illustrates that Congress views the
remedial statute as an effective measure to eliminate large national problems that are beyond the
bounds of governmental law enforcement agencies. Nevertheless, Congress, aware of courts and
attorneys’ struggle over the last twenty years in interpreting (and restricting) civil RICO, it also
showed its approval a continued expansion of RICO’s ability to curb widespread unlawful
practices.
III. THE MODERN APPLICATION OF CIVIL RICO
Even by the early 1990s, it was clear that RICO’s application had spread far beyond its
original congressional purpose.75 RICO was utilized primarily by private plaintiffs to target a
“garden-variety fraud and ordinary commercial disputes.”76 There were clear problems with this
type of RICO application, including how to interpret what many legal scholars argue is a poorly
71

See id. (quoting 8 U.S.C.§ 1324(a) (codifying section 274(a)). “8 U.S.C.§ 1324a(a) provides that it is unlawful for
a person or other entity to ‘hire, or to recruit or reer for a fee, for employment in the United States an alien knowing
the alien is an unauthorized alien . . . with respect to such employment.” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A)).
72
See King, supra note 2.
73
See Karin Rives, Illegal Immigration – Who Profits, Who Pays: Jobs Lure Immigrants to State, THE NEWS &
OBSERVER (Feb. 26, 2006) (“Four hundred thousand strong . . . [immigrants are] drawn by the jobs that North
Carolina employers eagerly offer . . . .”).
74
Stephen Ohlemacher, Number of Illegal Immigrants Hits 12M, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 7, 2006), available at
http://www.breitbart.com/news/2006/03/07/D8G6U2KO8.html (“The number of illegal immigrants in the United
States has grown to as many as 12 million, and they now account for about one in every 20 workers.”).
75
See Clarkin, Catherine M., Reves v. Ernst & Young: The Elimination of Professional Liability Under RICO, 43
Cath U.L. Rev. 1025, 1028 (1994).
76
See id. (citing A.B.A., Sec. Corp. Banking & Businesss Law, Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force 57
(1985) (reporting that out of the 270 civil RICO actions surveyed, 40% alleged securities fraud, 37% alleged
common law fraud in a commercial setting, and only 9% alleged ‘criminal activity of a type generally associated
with professional criminals”); see also Susan Getzendanner, Judicial “Pruning” of “Garden Variety Fraud” Civil
RICO Cases Does Not Work: It’s Time for Congress to Act, 43 VAND. L. REV. 673, 678 (1990).
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drafted statute,77 a massive federal court docket increase,78 and most importantly, unpredictable
and conflicting civil RICO requirements.79 Several judges, including former Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist, pleaded to Congress for an amendment to restrict civil RICO, although
Congress denied that request.80 Congressional action over the past twenty years into account
shows (at least implicitly) that Congress has acquiesced with RICO’s broad application in the
judicial system.
RICO is one of the most sophisticated and complicated federal statutes,81 and the
Supreme Court at least initially resisted any temptation to place specific limits on its statutory
scope.82 Over time, however, the Supreme Court has provided restrictive guidelines in effort to
provide lower courts guidance in uniformly interpreting RICO’s statutory provisions.
Nevertheless, federal courts have continued to struggle with RICO’s standing requirements,
which results in conflicting and often perplexing decisions. While there are policy arguments in
favor of a more restrictive interpretation, such as the adverse economic impact of widespread
RICO application and the proverbial ‘floodgate’ argument,83 it is beyond judicial powers to
create these boundaries.84 Yet, it seems that the Supreme Court has again attempted to restrict
civil RICO in its 2006 term without any congressional support or amendments to the statute.85
Section A of this section analyzes the Supreme Court’s opinion in Holmes, decided in its
1992 term.86 In Holmes, the Supreme Court placed a relatively narrow standing restriction on
civil RICO when it created a “direct proximate cause” limitation.87 This would clearly have an
impact in reducing the number of available private plaintiffs that have standing to bring a RICO
claim. It is worth noting that Holmes was decided prior to RICO’s 1996 legislative amendments
that further expanded RICO. Section B begins by discussing the case of Commercial Cleaning
Servs. v. Colin Service Systems, Inc. (“Commercial Cleaning”) decided in 2001, and further
discussed new applications of civil RICO following the 1996 amendments.88 Section C
discusses the impact the Supreme Court’s Anza decision, which expands the Holmes standing
limitations.
77

See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249 (1989) (asserting that “RICO [is] a poorly
drafted statute.”).
78
See Rehnquist, supra note 31.
79
Laurence A. Steckman, RICO Section 1962(c) Enterprises and the Present Status of the “Distinctness
Requirement in the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits, 21 Touro L. Rev. 1083, 1093 (2006) (noting that different
circuits have adopted different interpretations and tests in applying the RICO statute).
80
See Rehnquist, supra note 31, at 9.
81
See United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980) (noting that the statutory language in RICO is
particularly complicated, however, the Court believed it to be a “a carefully crafted piece of legislation”).
82
See Clarkin, Catherine M., Reves v. Ernst & Young: The Elimination of Professional Liability Under RICO, 43
CATH. U.L. REV. 1025, 1040 (1994).
83
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Personal Jurisdiction Under 18 U.S.C. § 1965, 75 NEB. L. REV. 476, 486-90 (1996) (stating that beginning in the
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actions a year”) (citing William J. Hughes, RICO Reform: How Much is Needed?, 43 Vand. L. Rev. 639, 644
(1990)).
84
See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249 (1989).
85
See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1991 (June 5, 2006)
86
Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992).
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See id.
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See Commercial Cleaning Servs. v. Colin Serv. Systems, Inc., 271 F. 3d 374 (2001).
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A. The Holmes “Direct Proximate Cause” Limitation to Civil RICO
Holmes directly addressed an issue that plagued civil RICO since its inception, which
was who has statutory standing to bring a claim against defendants that have violated one of
RICO’s predicate offenses.89 The issue is one of statutory construction. The pertinent facts of
Holmes were as follows: (1) The Securities Investor Protection Corporation (“SIPA”), a private
corporation,90 initiated suit against an investor, Robert G. Holmes (the “investor”), who
conspired in a stock-manipulation scheme that “disabled two broker-dealers from meeting
obligations to customers, thus triggering SIPC’s statutory duty to advance funds to reimburse the
defrauded customers[;]”91 (2) SIPC sought to recover this money from the investor utilizing civil
RICO, which would provide treble damages as well as attorney’s fees and costs;92 (3) the district
court found that SIPC had not satisfied the proximate cause requirement under RICO.93
The Ninth Circuit United States Court of Appeals reversed,94 and, as pertinent to the
proximate cause deficiency, held that the district court’s decision finding
no proximate cause to be error, [as it] . . . mistaken[ly] focus[ed] on the causal
relation between SIPC’s injury and the acts of [the investor] alone. [Because] he
could be held responsible for the acts of all his co-conspirators, . . . the district
court should have looked to the causal relation between SIPC’s injury and the acts
of all conspirators.95
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, certifying the question of whether the investor could be
held responsible for the actions of his co-conspirators, which directed the Court to an
examination of who has statutory standing under civil RICO to bring a claim under the statute.96
Justice Souter wrote for the Court’s majority and found that a literal interpretation of civil
RICO could be read to mean that under Section 1964, any plaintiff could recover by reason of
civil RICO simply by showing that (1) the defendant violated a RICO predicate act(s) under
section 1962; (2) the plaintiff was injured; (3) and the defendant’s violation was a “but for” cause

89

Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268.
SIPC provides investor protection by “[r]estoring funds to investors with assetsin the hands of bankrupt and
otherwise financially troubled brokerage firms.” See SIPC, http://www.sipc.org/who/whysipc.cfm (last visited Jan. 4
2007). “Though created by the Securities Investor Protection Act (15 U.S.C. §78aaa et seq., as amended), SIPC is
neither a governmental agency nor a regulatory authority. It is a nonprofit membership corporation, funded by its
member securities broker-dealers.” Id. at http://www.sipc.org/who/statute.cfm (last visited Jan. 4, 2006).
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Holmes, 908 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1990) (entering summary judgment for Holmes on the RICO claim, and ruling
that SIPC “does not meet the ‘purchaser-seller’ requirements for standing to assert RICO claims”)
94
See Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 908 F. 2d 1461 (1990).
95
Id.
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Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268.
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of plaintiff’s injury.97 Justice Souter, however, explicitly rejected this construction under an
“assumption” that Congress never meant to allow standing by all directly injured plaintiffs.98
Justice Souter turned to a statutory interpretation analysis by looking at RICO’s
development and history. The Court found that section 1964’s borrowed its language from the
federal anti-trust act, section 4 of the Clayton Act,99 which had in turn borrowed its structure
from section 7 of the Sherman Act.100 Accordingly, Justice Souter held that a plaintiff’s right to
sue under section 4 of the Clayton Act required a showing that the defendant’s violation not only
was the ‘but-for’ cause of his injury, but the proximate cause as well (but-for causation limitation
it be close enough to the harm looking at the chain of events).101 In recognizing the mirrored
language between statutes, Justice Souter held that “we can only assume it intended them
[section 4 of the Clayton Act and Section 1964(c) of civil RICO] to have the same meaning that
courts had already given them.”102 Thus, direct proximate cause was required in establishing
liability under civil RICO.103
“A plaintiff who complained of harm flowing merely from the misfortunes visited upon a
third person by the defendant’s acts [is] generally said to stand at too remote a distance to
recover.”104 It is also true that the less direct an injury, the more difficult it becomes to ascertain
the amount of a plaintiff’s damages attributable to the violation as distinct from other,
independent, factors.105 Accordingly, Justice Souter asserted that claims of the indirectly injured
would force courts to “adopt complicated rules apportioning damages among plaintiffs removed
at different levels of injury from the violative acts, to obviate the risk of multiple recoveries.”106
Consequently, the Supreme Court decided to outright rejected the argument that those not most
directly injured can act as a deterrent because those most directly injured can generally be
counted on to vindicate the law.107
In applying this judicially created interpretation of what it labeled “direct proximate
cause,” Justice Souter ultimately found SIPA too removed from the investor’s fraudulent
scheme, as those directly injured were the broker-dealers who were victims of fraud (although
these broker-dealers were repaid their lost money by SIPA). Moreover, although SIPC argued
that Congress placed a liberal construction clause to RICO, Justice Souter rejected that his
97

See id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (“[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of
section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefore in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover
[damages] . . .”).
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See id. at 268 (internal citations omitted).
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101
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analysis conflicted with that broad mandate.108 Rather, the Supreme Court found that if it
permitted suits by those “indirectly” injured, it would “open the door to ‘massive and complex
damages litigation, [which would] not only burden the courts, but [would] also undermine the
effectiveness of treble-damages suits.’”109
This rationale by Justice Souter illustrates the heart of RICO statutory standing
confusion. Although it reached its conclusion through a rationale that is unusual under the RICO
statute (e.g., comparing it to other statutory counterparts and thereby further complicating its
already intricate application),110 the crux of this whole debate is whether a plaintiff must be the
“most directly injured” or merely “directly injured” by the actions of the defendant. While the
most directly injured application, as applied in Holmes and later in the Supreme Court’s Anza
decision, may assist lower courts in creating bright line rules to limit RICO’s statutory scope, it
also closes the door to many other potential (and proper) private plaintiffs, which also would
restrict civil class actions that give “teeth” to civil RICO.
Justice Scalia, in his Holmes concurrence, pointedly stated that “[o]ne of the usual
elements of statutory standing is proximate causality.”111 Justice Scalia, however, rejected Justice
Souter’s holding that proximate causality is required in RICO because of its similar language
with the Clayton and Sherman Acts. Instead, Justice Scalia held:
[B]ecause it has always been the practice of common-law courts to require as a
condition of recovery . . . . Life is too short to pursue every human act to its most
remote consequences; ‘for want of a nail, a kingdom was lost’ is a commentary on
fate, not the statement of a major cause of action against a blacksmith.112
Justice Scalia assumed that proximate causality existed in RICO, and did not further the
discussion of how and where that line should be drawn.
While the Supreme Court clearly established a causation link (direct proximate cause) in
civil RICO claims, it failed to explain exactly how plaintiffs should show this connection with
regard to the many different types of predicate offenses under the statute.113 In fact, Holmes
resulted in numerous standards of proximate cause imposed by lower courts, with some even
requiring plaintiffs to “demonstrate that the defendant’s misreprentations were relied on.”114
However, reliance has never been a requisite element under Holmes.115 In fact, there has been
108
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110
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criticism that this reliance standard goes far beyond the construct of the “tripartite analysis” in
Holmes.116 In actuality, [n]o one has credibly argued that strict causation standards (often stated
in terms of reliance) have proved an impediment to otherwise meritorious individual suits.”117
Holmes’ direct proximate causation is clearly the “lynchpin of any civil RICO case”118 and a
court’s unpredictable interpretation can make or break a civil RICO claim.
B. Applying Civil RICO to Acts Unrelated to Organized Crime
Even before RICO’s INA predicate offense amendments in 1996, private parties
attempted to utilize civil RICO in various types of labor-management disputes.119 Although this
practice was criticized in the early 1990s,120 Congress continued expanding RICO’s predicate
acts to assist law enforcement by allowing private parties to enforce provisions of immigration
statutes by the suit of private attorneys general.121 Consequently, three different groups of RICO
plaintiffs have commenced actions as result of the addition of the INA provision of civil RICO.
The first instance is where a plaintiff corporation brings suit against a competitor
corporation that allegedly employed undocumented workers in violation of the INA to gain a
competitive advantage.122 These plaintiff corporations often lose lucrative contracts and
customers to competitors that can lower costs due to unlawfully employing undocumented
immigrants.123 The second instance is where lawfully employed workers bring a class action
civil RICO claim against an employer that allegedly hired illegal immigrants, which
consequently depress wages and produce otherwise unnecessary layoffs.124 Third, and possibly
the most innovative use civil RICO, is where undocumented workers themselves initiate a RICO
suit against their employer to enforce existing labor laws that protect them from exploitation.125
It is clear that these “schemes” were never a part of a more elaborate organized crime
scheme of hiring undocumented workers. The dilemma, at risk of oversimplification, is whether
civil RICO is proper to assist directly injured private parties in enforcing laws against those
profiting from unlawful practices. Although Congress has certainly expanded RICO far beyond
the sphere of organized crime, courts have generally been equally resistant to allow these types
of suits to reach past dispositive motions. That leaves the following question: is it for the courts
to decide the breadth and scope of civil RICO or Congress?
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1. Corporations Have Utilized Civil RICO to Sue Competitors that
Systematically and Unlawfully Employ Undocumented Immigrants to Gain a
Competitive Advantage
Although the INA amendment to RICO was enacted in 1996, it was not until 2000 that
the new offenses were asserted in a civil RICO suit.126 Commercial Cleaning Services
(“Commercial”) brought the lawsuit for damages against its direct competitor, Colin Service
Systems (“Colin”).127 Commercial alleged that Colin engaged in a pattern of racketeering
activity by hiring undocumented workers for profit in violation of Section 274 of the INA.128
The district court dismissed the case based upon its belief that Commercial had no standing to
bring suit because “its injury did not bear a ‘direct relation’ to Colin’s racketeering activity as
required by Holmes.129
Failing the Homes direct proximate cause requirement “precludes recovery by a party
who simply complains of injury which flows from the misfortunes visited upon a third person by
the defendant’s acts.”130 Commercial’s injury, according to the district court, was simply too far
removed to substantiate a RICO claim.131 But if Commercial was not directly injured by Colin’s
illegal hiring of the undocumented workers, it is difficult to imagine who was more directly
injured. It was established and undisputed that Commercial and Colin were direct competitors
and that Colin’s lower employee wages, avoidance of employment taxes, and workers’
compensation insurance resulted in substantially lower contacts bids than Commercial could
provide.
The district court’s opinion failed to properly discuss the 1996 amendments to RICO’s
predicate offenses. It held that even if the defendant violated the INA, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (“INS”) bore the responsibility to deter those activities. As illustrated
earlier in this article, civil RICO can be, and according to the Legislature should be, used to
assist in private enforcement against parties that unlawfully benefit through the utilization of
illegal racketeering schemes. The district court’s interpretation would virtually always require
the proper plaintiff to be a government law enforcement agency.
The district court supported its decision by citing to three cases that held violations of
federal law is too remote for a private party to claim damages under RICO.132 However, each of
126
See Commercial Cleaning Servs. v. Colin Serv. Systems, Inc, No. Civ.A. 3:99CV109, 2000 WL 545126, at *1
(D. Conn. Mar. 21, 2000).
127
See Commercial Cleaning Servs. v. Colin Serv. Systems, Inc., 271 F. 3d 374 (2001).
128
See id.
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Commercial Cleaning, 2000 WL 545126, at *7-8.
130
Id. at *3.
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See id. at *7.
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Id.; see also Medgar Evers Tenants Ass’n v. Medgar Evers Houses Associates, L.P., 25 F. Supp 2.d 116
(E.D.N.Y. 1998) (dismissing RICO suit from tenants against a housing project association for injuries sustained as a
result false and misleading statements to the U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Dev. (“HUD”)); Barr Lab., Inc. v.
Quantum Pharmics, Inc., 827 F. Supp 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (dismissing RICO action from plaintiff drug
manufacturer against a competitor when it learned it filed false applications with the Food and Drug
Administration); Kingston Square Tenants Ass’n v. Tuskegee Gardens, Ltd., 792 F. Supp. 1566 (S.D. Fla. 1992)
(dismissing RICO action against plaintiff tenant association against owners and managers of its housing complex
because it filed multiple false applications for HUD funds and subsequently misused the obtained funds).
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these cases were decided prior to 1996 or dealt with direct private enforcement of the INA
statute, which is explicitly not permitted. Conversely, this was not a case that required private
enforcement of the INA, but rather it was the INA violations that established civil RICO standing
under its predicate offenses provision. Even assuming that Colin committed the alleged acts, the
district court held that “[RICO’s] predicate offenses are aimed at avoiding compliance with the
immigration laws and detection of those activities by the INS” and the plaintiff’s injuries were
merely incidental to the defendants illegal activity.133
Finally, and most damaging to Commercial’s position, the district court found that a jury
would be required to make an impossible deduction in order to satisfy the Homes direct relation
test.134 Specifically, it would be required to determine whether the plaintiff’s lost profits was
primarily caused by lost lucrative contracts as a result of the Colin’s illegal hiring practices or
because of other more removed reasons such as comparative quality, business reputations,
fluctuations in demand, among other possible causes.
Although the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s dismissal of the
case, it did so without directly addressing many of the contentious issues.135 The appellate court
found that in viewing Commercial’s complaint, Commercial adequately stated a proximate
relationship between its injury and Colin’s pattern of alleged racketeering.136 The court turned
directly to the language of the statute and took a bright line, formalistic RICO interpretation.137
The decision recognized the difficulty in determining whether Commercial’s damages were
‘directly’ caused by Colin’s unlawful practices.138 Holmes “expressly warned against applying a
mechanical test detached from the policy considerations associated with the proximate cause
analysis at play in the case.”139 Therefore, the court turned to the Holmes policy considerations
in its analysis.140
Reading the allegations in a light most favorable to the plaintiff,141 the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals found that Commercial adequately stated a direct proximate relationship
between its injury and Colin’s pattern of racketeering activity.142 In applying its version of the
Holmes proximate cause test, the court found that the central factor of the district court’s
dismissal was the difficulty for a jury in determining the cause of damages to the plaintiff.143 It
rejected this as a proper reason for dismissal, citing the difficulty to determine exact cause of
damages insufficient to dismiss this case.144 With more questions left unanswered than
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answered, Colin swiftly settled the case for an undisclosed amount of money due to the risk of
treble damages plus attorneys’ fees and costs.145
The Commercial Cleaning district court applied Holmes to limit standing for nearly every
private plaintiff against a competitor that uses an illegal scheme to damage the plaintiff. As
illustrated infra, this analysis is ultimately the position of the Supreme Court in Anza.146 Yet this
interpretation severely limits the application of civil RICO in ways that Congress did not intend.
Commercial Cleaning is based on nearly identical allegations those in Anza, except for the type
of predicate offense. Both situations provide facts that, on their face, fall squarely under the
RICO statute.
2. Legally Employed Workers Terminated Because of Their Employer’s
Unlawful Employment of Undocumented Workers Can Utilize Civil RICO to
Recover Damages and Lost Wages
In Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co. (“Mendoza v. Zirkle”), decided only a few months after
Commercial Cleaning,147 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that allegations of illegal
immigrant hiring is appropriately plead as a predicate offense for a RICO claim.148 After
Commercial Cleaning, it was clear that its decision “told people [that] are competitively injured
by the abuse of the immigration system” have a remedy under civil RICO.149 Plaintiff class
representatives Olivia Mendoza and Juana Mendiola (collectively “Mendoza”) were lawfully
employed by the defendants, Zirkle Fruit Company, Matson Fruit Company and Selective
Employment Agency, Inc. (collectively “Zirkle”).150
Mendoza alleged that Zirkle was engaged in two related illegal schemes to depress
employee wages in violation of RICO.151 Like the district court in Commercial Cleaning, the
district court in Mendoza v. Zirkle dismissed this suit because, in pertinent part, Mendoza lacked
standing to pursue a claim under RICO.152 It found that although Mendoza properly alleged
violation of federal immigration laws, Mendoza’s injury was “simply too speculative to survive
the motion.”153
The facts in the record were as follows: (1) beginning in 1996, Zirkle knowingly hired at
least fifty undocumented workers per year as part of a scheme to depress employee wages; (2)
Zirkle exploited these workers’ economic situation and fear of asserting their rights to drive the
wage rate for both documented and undocumented workers to a level lower than it would be if
defendants did not hire the undocumented workers; (3) the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (“INS”) made findings that the majority of Zirkle and Matson’s workforce was
145
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undocumented.154 Mendoza consequently argued that they were harmed by the lower wages paid
from Zirkle because of their illegal immigrant hiring scheme.155
As to whether Mendoza had standing to bring a RICO claim, Zirkle argued that “the
plaintiffs lack[ed] standing to bring a RICO claim because they ha[d] not been injured by the
defendants’ practices . . . ,”156 therefore they failed to satisfy 18 U.S.C § 1964(c).157 Zirkle
asserted that the alleged injury did not confer standing because “(1) the injury was not
proximately caused by the defendants’ alleged violations and (2) the claimed injury [was] not
sufficiently concrete.”158
The district court found this case to appear “superficially” similar to cases where
plaintiffs allege predicate acts of making “false statements to, or otherwise misleading,
governmental agencies.”159 In each of those cases, district courts found the plaintiffs to be
merely indirect victims with the governmental agency as the direct proximately injured party.160
Zirkle thus argued that it was the INS who was the directly injured victim because Zirkle filed
false I-9 forms.161
Yet those situations are clearly distinguishable from Mendoza v. Zirkle, under simple
theories of economics.162 It was not the defendant’s misleading or false statements to the
government that led to depressed wages, but rather Zirkle’s illegal hiring scheme that allowed it
to save on the cost of labor. Through the hiring of undocumented workers, Zirkle was able to
increase the supply of cheap labor and decrease the demand for expensive, but legal, employees.
The result thus used unlawful means to depress wages. The distinct court agreed and further
distinguished this case because the illegal hiring scheme alleged did not depend on any
intervening action of a governmental agency or other third party.163 The district court thus found
that Mendoza was a direct victim of Zirkle’s illegal hiring scheme.164
However, the district court ultimately dismissed the case because of its belief that
damages were impossible to calculate beyond sheer speculation.165 It stated that the plaintiff
would have extremely difficultly in proving, “with the required specificity[,] what impact
154
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[Zirkle’s] alleged wrongdoing has had in the context of the whole labor market.”166
Consequently, the district court dismissed on Mendoza’s failure to allege “a sufficiently nonspeculative” financial loss as a result of Zirkle’s wrongdoing.167
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the dismissal due to the “speculative”
nature of the damages.168 It, like the district court, first found that Zirkle’s alleged scheme was
intended to give the employer a contract advantage at the expense of the legal workers. The
court also noted that that the undocumented workers cannot “be counted on to bring suit for the
law’s vindication.”169 Therefore, both the district court and court of appeals found that the
Mendoza plaintiffs were the direct victims of the alleged scheme.170
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, though, reversed the district court’s decision as to
the speculative nature of Mendoza’s damages.171 It held that Mendoza “singularly [has] the
ability to define wages in this labor market. . . ,”172 and found that the Mendoza plaintiffs must be
allowed to make their case through the presentation of evidence.173 The amount of damages is a
factual question that is proper for a jury, not a question of law to be decided at the summary
judgment stage of the case.174 The Ninth Circuit distinguished between uncertainty in the fact of
damage and in the amount of damages.175 Indeed, Zirkle does not argue any risk of multiple
fiscal recovery.176 Even if that were the case, lawsuits with multiple potential plaintiffs who can
recover for the “alleged illegal hiring scheme would not threaten multiple recovery of passed-on
harm.”177
Immediately following this decision, Mendoza settled with Zirkle for $1.3 million, the
first settlement of an illegal immigrant wage depression suit in United States history.178
Additionally, the class members and legal workers also received back pay for each hour worked
in the company’s warehouse and fruit orchards from 1999 to 2004.179 Although Zirkle did not
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admit any guilt of wrongdoing, it cited the risk of treble damages plus attorneys’ fees and costs
as the motivating factor to settle.180
This line of reasoning in Mendoza v. Zirkle was also adopted by the sixth circuit in
Trollinger v. Tyson Foods (“Trollinger v. Tyson”).181 In Trollinger v. Tyson, the plaintiffs class
representatives (collectively “Trollinger”) brought a civil RICO action against the defendant
(“Tyson”) due to a wage-related dispute.182 “On behalf of themselves and a putative class of
similarly-situated workers, the four employees allege that Tyson violated RICO by engaging in a
scheme with several employment agencies to depress the wages of Tyson’s hourly employees by
hiring illegal immigrants.”183
Trollinger v. Tyson was initially dismissed by the district court due to a Holmes direct
proximate cause attack where Tyson argued that the employee’s union was the appropriate
plaintiff. Tyson also argued that Trollinger could not establish a “‘direct relation between the
injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.’”184 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the district court stating that dismissal in this stage of the proceedings was not proper
“[g]iven the unadorned allegations in the complaint, given the requirement that we must assume
plaintiffs will be able to prove them, and given the absence of any discovery (or expert
reports).”185
3. Undocumented Workers Can Sue Employers that Profit from Systematically
Employing, Harboring, and Trafficking Them in Order to Gain an Unfair
Competitive Advantage
Possibly the most innovative approach taken in bringing a civil RICO claim related to an
INA offense occurred Zavala v. Wal-Mart (“Wal-Mart”).186 This case stemmed from a sting by
the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement against janitors and their respective
contractors at Wal-Mart. As part of “Operation Rollback,” federal agents arrested hundreds of
janitors, including twelve of the plaintiffs (collectively “Zavala”) in this action for immigration
violations.187 This was not the first time that a Wal-Mart contractor was alleged to have
participated in immigration-related offenses,188 although Wal-Mart denied having any knowledge
of any use of that company’s undocumented labor.189 “Because of this alleged pattern of
conduct, Wal-Mart ha[d] been under investigation by federal law enforcement authorities for
over five years.”190
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Zavala alleged that Wal-Mart systematically employed, harbored, and trafficked in the labor
of immigrants, aided and abetted violation of the immigration laws, failed to pay their wages and
overtime and benefits as required, and concealed their profits and practices from detection.191
The exploitation by Wal-Mart occurred in a number of different ways including obligating them
to work in excess of the statutory maximum number of hours, every day of the week, denying
them of lawful pay and benefits under the FLSA, as well as time for sick leave, meals or breaks,
and paying them in cash without withholding payroll taxes.192 Wal-Mart also “easily could, and
did, hide them from law enforcement authorities, by threatening them with deportation or
locking them into the stores for the duration of their shifts.”193
Wal-Mart provided the potential for undocumented workers to recover treble damages with
attorney’s fees and costs for their substantial injuries. This case ultimately failed under the
predicate offenses and “racketeering activity” requirements under the statute, yet the court’s
opinion did not find issue with these plaintiffs under a direct proximate cause analysis. It is quite
clear that the Zavala plaintiffs did not benefit from the illegal actions of the defendant, as
purported by Wal-Mart. These workers were exploited, locked in janitor’s closets, lacked any
benefits, worked seven days a week, and were paid minimum wage. However, Wal-Mart was
dismissed due to the lack of proper pleading under RICO, not due to any direct proximate cause
limitation. Therefore, under a different set of facts or with proper pleading, this case may have
resulted in a favorable award for the undocumented workers.
C. Statutory Interpretation and Court’s Various Methods of Analyzing and
Applying Civil RICO
As noted throughout this article, there has been long-standing and “widespread judicial
animosity” towards the pervasive utilization of civil RICO.194 And although Congress has been
keenly aware of the many issues courts have expressed with the statute since at least the early
1980s, it has continued to expand, not limit, RICO beyond its mafia fighting roots. As mentioned
supra, even former Chief Justice Rehnquist pled to Congress to limit civil RICO jurisdiction
without avail.195 In the beginning, however, the Supreme Court “rebuffed [] attempts to restrict
standing for civil RICO claims, noting that the wide application of the statute is ‘inherent in the
statute as written, and its correction must lie with Congress.’”196
Because RICO requires a congressionally mandated broad application and the possibility
of treble damages as well as attorneys’ fees and costs, the statute was clearly subject to misuse.
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Before this issue reached the Supreme Court for the first time, “[a] number of courts recognized
the potential for abuse . . . and created limitations to narrow [civil RICO’s] reach.”197 Although
these courts in the early 1980s experienced much of the same issues that still persist today with
civil RICO, the Supreme Court’s holding in Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. was clear to defer the
policy issue of RICO’s seemingly limitless application to Congress.198
Although similar standing issues that plagued civil RICO decades ago still remain today,
the context is entirely different. In the 1970s and 1980s, it was clear that Congress enacted
RICO to combat organized crime. Therefore, if courts were to interpret the words of civil RICO
in light of its congressional intent back then, it is understandable that some courts interpreted
RICO as “directed at the archetypal, intimidating mobster.”199 Even back in the 1980s, however,
the Supreme Court chose not to read beyond the plain text of the statute and found that civil
RICO permitted broad application to even ordinary fraud cases.200
Today, civil RICO application is much more complicated. Because the statute has been
amended numerous times in a manner that expands the statute beyond organized crime, and
because the mafia has a significantly less impact on today’s society, it is unreasonable to argue
that the statute should only be applicable to those affected by mafia related crimes. In fact, civil
RICO’s primary use for the past decade, at least, has not against the mafia. These facts should
promote the Supreme Court’s continued ‘plain language’ statutory interpretation of the statue
instead of deferring to the statutes original purpose. RICO was seemingly effective against
fighting organized crime, why should the Court interject a narrowing application against illegal
immigration or fraud? Both of these issues greatly affect the United State’s economy as much,
or even more, than organized crime in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
1. The Supreme Court Should Interpret Statutes Using its “Plain Language”
Unless the Language is Ambiguous or the Result Would be Absurd
As the Supreme Court recently stated, the starting point discerning congressional intent is
the existing statutory text,201 and not the predecessor statutes.202 “It is well established that
‘when the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts-at least where disposition
required by the text is not absurd-is to enforce it according to its terms.’”203 Additionally, the
Supreme Court can “construe the language so as to give effect to the intent of Congress.”204 Yet,
there “is no invariable rule of the discovery of that intention. To take a few words from their
context . . . isolated to attempt to determine their meaning, certainly would not contribute greatly
to the discovery of the purpose of the draftsmen of a statute . . . .”205 It is only when that
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meaning “has led to absurd or futile results, however, that [the Supreme Court] has looked
beyond the words to the purpose of the Act.206
This statutory construction employed by the Supreme Court has not substantially changed
since Minor v. Mechanics’ Bank of Alexandria207 in 1828. Thus, when the language of a statute
is unambiguous, the Court should presume that Congress “said what it meant and meant what it
said.”208 Only in the “rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a
result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters . . . [should] the intention of the
drafters, rather than the strict language, control[].”209
Statutory interpretation is almost never as straightforward as it seems, and interpreting
the RICO statute is no exception. RICO has been declared one of the most complicated federal
laws and its interpretation is therefore exceedingly more difficult than most other laws.210
However, difficulty in interpretation as to the scope of the statute is a matter for Congress to
amend if it so intends and not for Supreme Court.
2. The Supreme Court Has Historically Deferred Policy Issues to Congress
Regarding Civil RICO’s Broad Application
The “Civil remedies” provision of RICO asserts that “[a]ny person injured in his business
or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue . . . .”211 The
language of this provision is clear and unambiguous, therefore the Supreme Court should provide
a ‘plain meaning’ interpretation unless the result is be absurd.212 RICO’s broad mandate to
liberally construe the statute illustrates congressional intent not narrowly tailor it in the best
interest of the judiciary.
In Sedima, the Supreme Court “rejected a restrictive interpretation of § 1964(c) that
would have made it a condition for maintaining a civil RICO action both that the defendant had
already been convicted of a predicate racketeering act or of a RICO violation. . . “213 Even in
1989, the Supreme Court “acknowledged concern . . . over civil RICO’s use against ‘legitimate’
businesses, as well as ‘mobsters and organized criminals.’”214 Yet, in Sedima, the case was
exceedingly more difficult to figure out what constituted a “pattern of racketeering activities,” as
proscribed in the statute.215 The Supreme Court, first in Holmes, and now in Anza, had to
determine who had standing to sue under the language of 18 U.S.C. 1964(c).
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Nothing in the language of the statute suggests that “by reason of” equals “most directly
affected.” But, as illustrated supra in both Part I.B and Part II.B, Congress, the Supreme Court,
and lower courts have different standards as to how far civil RICO’s standing boundaries can
reach. Lower courts even disagree with each other as to what are the important factors to
determine whether a plaintiff has standing to sue. This has led to conflicting, confusing, and
unpredictable decisions that can consume six years to litigate with two, possibly three reversals.
3. The Competing RICO Interpretations by District Courts, Circuit Courts of
Appeal, and the Supreme Court
The pattern of each of these civil RICO cases is strikingly similar. District courts, which
have long voiced concern with the far-reaching scope of civil RICO, have uniformly dismissed
each of the aforementioned lawsuits for either lack of sufficient direct proximate cause or
speculative damages. The appellate court’s decisions all reversed the district courts, holding that
Congress intended a broad application of RICO so long as the requisite elements are sufficiently
plead. Additionally, the ‘speculative nature’ of alleged damages should be a question of fact left
for a jury to decide and should not lead to dismissal of the claim. In the middle of the two sides
is the Supreme Court, which has, up until Anza, taken the approach that permit most civil RICO
claims to proceed and defers the policy issues with the statute to Congress.
The RICO statute, although unpopular in the judiciary system because of its difficult and
broad application, has seemingly been used successfully in curbing many unlawful schemes used
by individuals and corporations to achieve a competitive advantage. Profiting on illegal activity
such as systematic fraud or violations of the INA can be controlled through the use of the
powerful, broad sweeping statute of civil RICO. There are protective measures built into the
statute, such as a ‘By reason of’ element and a requisite pattern of unlawful activity, as well as
related damages suffered, which protect courts from unsubstantiated claims. However, Anza has
essentially eliminated the civil RICO cause of action by any party other than a governmental law
enforcement agency. This goes against the legislative intent that civil RICO be available to
allow ‘private attorneys general’ in holding those who violate the law liable for their actions.
It is clear that there are two areas that courts most commonly disagree that influence the
outcome in most civil RICO cases. First, a court must decide whether it believes “By reason of”
must be the “most directly injured” party to the defendant’s actions, or whether merely showing
“direct injury” is enough. Private plaintiffs argue that the most directly injured party will always
be a government plaintiff because it is always an illegal act that permits a RICO claim. This
would therefore frustrate congressional intent, as the enforcement agency with the power of
enforcing that illicit action would be the only proper plaintiff in a RICO suit. As stated supra in
Part I.A. and I.B., Congress added a civil form of RICO to assist law enforcement in allowing
private parties the ability to become a “private attorney general” to recover its damages and
reduce illicit activity (i.e. a predicate offense of RICO).
Yet, courts that seek to restrict the broad reach of civil RICO can limit these claims by
holding that only the most directly injured party can bring suit. Incidentally, this has also limited
unpopular class actions civil RICO lawsuits, which usually have several millions of dollars at
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stake.216 While this may be a desirable result for the judiciary, courts are not allowed to legislate
from the bench where Congress has had the opportunity to limit civil RICO for thirty years and
has failed to do so.
Second, and mostly beyond the scope of this article but still important to standing in
RICO claims, is the issue of damages. On the one hand, restrictive courts find that any party that
cannot show concrete damages, but rather what it calls speculative damages, must lead to the
dismissal of a RICO claim. This is especially true in RICO actions related to employment law at
issue because concrete damages for depressed wages would be very difficult to illustrate absent
expert testimony or detailed evidence that may not be available to the plaintiffs. Therefore,
dismissal for speculative damages at the summary judgment phase of a RICO claim ultimately
limits the statutory scope of civil RICO, albeit through indirect means. However, other courts
counter this problem with two answers. First, even though it may be difficult to calculate
damages in some civil RICO claims, difficulty of calculation is not a sufficient reason for
dismissal. Second, damages are most commonly a question of fact and not law; therefore it is
proper for a jury, not a judge, to decide this question.
D. The New “Direct Proximate Cause” Limitation to RICO
The expansion of civil RICO in Commercial Cleaning and its subsequent line of RICO
cases did not go unnoticed by the United States Supreme Court. In its 2006 term, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to two civil RICO cases, Anza217 and Mohawk Industries v. Williams
(“Mohawk Industries”), in what turned out to be a disguised effort to restrict the direct proximate
cause limitation first purported in Holmes.218 However, the tension between Congress, the
United States Supreme Court, and various circuits will not end here.
This section will first analyze the Supreme Court’s analysis of Anza and its efforts to
limit future use of civil RICO in private plaintiff lawsuits between corporations such as those in
Commercial Cleaning, Trollinger v. Tyson, and Mendoza. Although this was a clear attempt to
restrict civil RICO claims under a statutory standing analysis, it will ultimately fail to limit these
claims under a literal reading of the statute, as illustrated in the remanded decision by the
Eleventh Circuit in Mohawk Industries, published on September 27, 2006.219 The next section
will analyze this most recent Eleventh Circuit Mohawk Industries decision to determine what
impact, if any, the decision in Anza has on future competitor claims under civil RICO. The final
section will discuss the current issues and conflicts with the Supreme Court and lower courts’
interpretations of RICO
1. The Supreme Court in Anza Directly Impacted Private Plaintiffs’ Ability to
Bring a Claim By Further Narrowing the Holmes’ Direct Proximate Cause
Limitation in Civil RICO
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Anza’s facts look similar to those in Commercial Cleaning, with the primary difference
being the type of predicate offense under civil RICO.220 Ideal Steel Supply Corporation
(“Ideal”) sold “steel mill products along with related supplies and services [and] operate[d] two
store locations in New York.”221 Ideal had only one principal competitor, National Steel Supply
(“National”), owned by Joseph and Vincent Anza, which offered similar products and services in
its two New York stores.
The scheme in Anza is relatively simple compared to those in most RICO cases. Ideal
claimed that National “engaged in an unlawful racketeering scheme aimed at ‘gain[ing] sales and
market share at Ideal’s expense.’”222 National allegedly did not charge sales tax to its cashpaying customers on transactions that were not exempt from sales tax under New York state
law.223 This allowed National to reduce its prices without affecting its profit margin, and as a
result, National had to file fraudulent tax returns to the New York State Department of Taxation
and Finance in an effort to conceal this conduct.224
This last fact led to severe consequences for the Anza plaintiffs. The Supreme Court
confused National’s tax return actions with Ideal’s alleged injury. Where in fact, Ideal never
alleged that the actual filing of the fraudulent tax forms caused injury to Ideal, but rather
National’s fraudulent tax fraud scheme allowed National to lower its costs than Ideal could
afford. Ideal’s complaint asserted “that [National’s] goal, which they achieved, was to give
National a competitive advantage over Ideal.”225 Consequently, the illegal actions of National
(tax fraud) and injury to Ideal (lost customers and unlawful competitive advantage) should have
been adequate to satisfy a civil RICO pleading requirements.
Yet, the Supreme Court disagreed. According to the Court, its analysis “beg[an]-and []
largely end[ed] - with Holmes.”226 By alleging that the tax and mail fraud activities of National
were the basis for the predicate offenses under RICO, the Supreme Court opened the door to a
direct proximate cause restriction. In its own words:
Ideal’s theory is that [National] harmed it by defrauding the New York tax
authority and using the proceeds from the fraud to offer lower prices designed to
attract more customers. The RICO violation alleged by Ideal is that [National’s
owners] conducted National’s affairs through a pattern of mail fraud and wire
fraud. The direct victim of this conduct was the State of New York, not Ideal. It
was the State that was being defrauded and the State that lost tax revenue as a
result.227
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This remarkable quote was fatal to Ideal’s case. The Supreme Court, however, inadvertently
limited itself to a narrow holding. Rather than looking to National’s offense and the injury
sustained to Ideal by National’s acts, the Court decided this case on a technicality using a
formalistic interpretation of Ideal’s pleadings.
This decision by Supreme Court is an attempt to limit civil RICO in an unprecedented
manner. As pointedly (and properly) stated by Justice Thomas in his dissent:
The Court today limit[ed] the lawsuits that may be brought under the civil
enforcement provision of [RICO] by adopting a theory of proximate causation
that is supported neither by the Act nor by our decision in [Holmes], on which the
Court principally relies. . . . [The Court’s] stringent proximate-causation
requirement succeeds in precluding recovery . . . for plaintiffs whose injuries are
precisely those that Congress aimed to remedy through the authorization of civil
RICO suits.228
It is clearly within the facts of Anza that Ideal was directly and proximately injured by the
unlawful acts by National, which were predicate acts under the RICO statute. The decision of
the Majority goes against the broad congressional mandate to liberally construe RICO.229 The
Anza majority distorted facts in who was directly injured in a manner that is largely outcome
determinative. Ideal never alleged that it was injured because the State of New York did not
receive taxes, as purported by the Supreme Court majority.
Rather, it was National’s practice of not charging tax to cash-paying customers that
permitted National to undercut Ideal’s prices and steal its customers. Whereas New York would
seek only payment of back taxes and any associated penalties, Ideal is seeking to remedy itself,
not with the taxes that National saved, but on Ideal’s lost business and profits due to National’s
unlawful activity.
This misinterpretation of damages allowed the Court to find a separation between the
alleged predicate acts, and the damages sustained by Ideal. As such, Justice Thomas noted that:
It is not fair to require a plaintiff to prove that the tort caused the lower of prices
at the motion to dismiss stage. . . . The allegation that . . . National was able to
charge a lower price after tax because of its fraud suffices to permit Ideal to
survive a motion to dismiss on the question whether the prices were lowered due
to the fraud, as opposed to other factors.230
Most importantly, “[t]he Court . . . permits a defendant to evade liability for harms that are not
only foreseeable, but the intended consequences of the defendant’s unlawful behavior.”231 This
allows a defendant, which “is plainly morally responsible” for acts to an easily identifiable
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plaintiff to avoid punishment where there is “no basis in the RICO statute, in common-law tort,
or in Holmes for reaching this result.”232
The Supreme Court’s decision in Anza is likely a result of the widespread “[j]udicial
sentiment that civil RICO’s evolution is undesirable.”233 For these reasons, courts can now
preclude precisely the claims the Congress aimed to protect.234 At this stage of the lawsuit, it is
not for the court to decide the merits of the claim, but whether Ideal had properly plead the
elements under RICO. After the Supreme Court decided Anza, the decision was cited in more
than fifteen decisions within three months to support dismissal of a RICO claim based on a direct
proximate cause analysis.
2. The Eleventh Circuit Distinguished Mohawk From Anza Although it is Unclear
Whether the Eleventh Circuit’s Decision Was Correctly Decided in Light of
the Supreme Court’s Decision
Anza was one of two civil RICO cases that the Supreme Court granted certiorari to in
2006. While the Supreme Court originally granted writ to Mohawk Industries on the certified
question of “[w]hether a defendant corporation and its agents can constitute an “enterprise”
under [RICO], in light of the settled rule that a RICO defendant must “conduct” or “participate
in” the affairs of some larger enterprise and not just its own affairs,”235 the Court would never
answer this question. Rather, certiorari was “dismissed as improvidently granted” in light of
Anza and remanded the case down to the Eleventh Circuit “for further consideration.”236
It is no stretch to infer from the Supreme Court’s Anza decision that it believed that
Mohawk Industries should be dismissed for lack of direct proximate cause. Otherwise, the
Supreme Court would have viewed Mohawk Industries’ deficiencies as unique from those in
Anza and subsequently answer the certified question. Despite this, the Eleventh Circuit chose to
distinguish Mohawk Industries from Anza.
The facts of Mohawk Industries are as follows: 1) Mohawk Industries is the second
largest carpet and rug manufacturer in the United States;237 2) allegedly Mohawk, with its
recruiting agencies, hired and harbored undocumented workers in an effort to depress wages;238
3) the plaintiffs (collectively “Williams”) alleged that in addition to recruiting employees at the
United States–Mexican border, Mowhak concealed its efforts to hire illegal immigrants by
destroying documents and in assisting illegal workers in evading detection by law
enforcement;239 4) this, in turn, permitted Mohawk in lowering labor costs by reducing the
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number of legal workers it must hire, which consequently depressed the wages it pays legal
hourly workers.240
The facts of Mohawk look most similar to those in Mendoza v. Zirkle, where the
defendant unlawfully depressed wages through a scheme to hire illegal immigrants. In Mendoza
v. Zirkle, both the district court and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals believed that the Mendoza
plaintiffs were the most directly injured by its employer’s illegal hiring scheme. Both the district
court and the court of appeals in Mendoza v. Zirkle believed that immigration enforcement
officers or another governmental agency (like the IRS) were most directly injured by Zirkle’s
unlawful acts. In that case, it was the speculation of damages and whether Mendoza could
illustrate actual damages that both courts struggled to determine. Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit
found that Mendoza’s case should be allowed to go forward and both parties subsequently
settled.
The case of Mohawk Industries illustrates the clash between direct proximate cause and
damages. Under nearly identical facts as Mendoza v. Zirkle, the Supreme Court viewed the
weakness in this case as one of direct proximate cause. Now, with Anza recently decided,
RICO’s new direct proximate cause limitation potentially restricted the scope of all private
plaintiffs injured in a matter that could conceivably be indirect (e.g., the governmental
enforcement agency is the most directly injured). Here, like in Anza, the injuries sustained by
Williams could be due to several factors other than the employment of undocumented workers.
Mohawk Industries never paid the workers below minimum wage, although the wages were
below other similar businesses in the city (e.g., speculation of damages argument). Mohawk,
being one of the largest carpet and rug manufacturer in the world, has considerable influence and
flexibility of the wages it pays employees.
Unlike Anza, however, Williams did not allege any tax or mail fraud conspiracies (e.g.,
the hiring of undocumented workers led to lower wage taxes or benefit compensation). It is
reasonable, under the formalistic approach by the Supreme Court, that immigration enforcement
agencies may be the most directly injured by Mohawks unlawful labor practice. This would be
analogous the Court’s Anza decision where the New York State Department of Taxation was the
most directly affected by Ideal’s tax fraud scheme.
Fortunately for the plaintiffs in Mohawk Industries, the Eleventh Circuit distinguished the
Supreme Court’s Anza decision. In point of fact, instead of a “direct proximate cause” analysis
(which the Supreme Court analogized to the most directly and proximately injured), the Eleventh
Circuit labeled its Holmes analysis “‘By Reason Of’ (or a broad interpretation of “direct
proximate cause”) the substantive RICO violations.”241 The Eleventh Circuit cited Trollinger v.
Tyson for its “by reason of” test242 where the plaintiffs must show: (1) a sufficiently direct injury
so that a plaintiff has standing to sue; and (2) proximate cause.243 Making this distinction is
important because it removes the level of directness required under Anza and has a lower burden
of directness of the injury sustained by the plaintiff.
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The Supreme Court was likely asserting that the proper RICO plaintiff would be the
governmental law enforcement agency (in this case Immigration and Customs Enforcement)
affected by the defendant’s illegal actions. Whereas, the Eleventh Circuit’s subtle difference
allows multiple proper RICO plaintiffs so long as the injury was a direct and proximate result of
the defendant’s actions. This limitation difference is critical in a RICO standing analysis and
continues to be the factor most commonly used to limit civil RICO claims.
The Mohawk Industries court was able to reconcile its decision under Holmes and Anza
by asserting that Holmes allowed “directly injured victims . . . to vindicate the law as ‘private
attorneys general,’ without any of the problems attendant upon suits by plaintiffs injured more
remotely.”244 The court looked at the Williams plaintiffs’ allegations as true in Mohawk’s
motion to dismiss and was able to conclude sufficient proximate cause. The court also rejected
Mohawk’s claims that other economic factors contributed to Williams’ alleged wage depression
(‘speculative damages’ argument).245 The Eleventh Circuit’s decision dealt with both limitations
in civil RICO. It found direct proximate cause under the Holmes and Anza standard can include
private plaintiffs and not just governmental enforcement agencies; and it found that even
difficult to calculate damages are a question of fact proper for a jury and not an appropriate
limitation at the summary judgment stage.
The Eleventh Circuit found that concerns in Holmes and Anza, where there may have
been a more directly injured party, simply did not apply in this case. The court explicitly stated
that
[t]here is no more direct injured party who could bring suit. Mohawk posits the
United States as the only other victim because of its interest in enforcing
immigration laws. But as plaintiffs aptly point out, the United States is
responsible for all federal criminal laws, which includes RICO’s other predicate
acts. Under Mohawk’s theory, the United States would arguably be the most
direct victim of all RICO predicate, criminal acts. Congress, however,
criminalized the employment of illegal workers in part to protect legal workers. It
is consistent with civil RICO’s purposes – to expand enforcement beyond federal
prosecutors with limited public resources – to turn victims (here, Mohawk’s legal
workers) into prosecutors as private attorneys general seeking to eliminate illegal
hiring activity by their own employer.246
This statement precisely describes the tension between the United States Supreme Court and
Congress. While the Supreme Court has limited civil RICO’s statutory scope, Congress, like
Eleventh Circuit, never intended such limitations. Now, depending on a court’s statutory
interpretation, civil RICO will continue to produce unpredictable, and often conflicting,
decisions without reliable means of predictability.
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In response to the Eleventh Circuit’s decision, which mostly circumvented the Supreme
Court’s Anza decision, the Mohawk defendants have again filed for certiorari to the Supreme
Court on December 19, 2006.247 In its petition, Mohawk argues that “[t]he Eleventh Circuit’s
ratification of [Williams’ theory of a RICO offense] is at odds with [the Supreme Court’s
holding] . . . in Anza.”248 It further alleged that the “Eleventh Circuit ignored the central holding
of Anza–that RICO civil plaintiffs must plead an injury directly caused by the RICO predicate
acts and not by another ‘set of actions . . . entirely distinct from the alleged RICO violation.”249
Instead, Mohawk alleged that “the Eleventh Circuit fundamentally misread Anza to hold that it is
enough for civil RICO standing where there is some ‘correlation’ between the predicate act
(illegal hiring) and the asserted injury (depressed wage levels).”250 Mohawk asserted that “[t]he
instant case [Mohawk Industries] has identical defects [to Anza] which are patently apparent.”251
This creates a complicated problem for the Supreme Court. On the one hand, it is fairly
clear that the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Mohawk Industries contradicts the Supreme Court’s
decision in Anza. The Supreme Court had previously vacated a similar Eleventh Circuit decision
in Mohawk Industries before Anza, and remanded the case in light of its Anza decision. The
Eleventh Circuit’s second decision was similar to its first, ignoring much of Anza outside its
particular facts. On the other hand, if the Supreme Court grants certiorari to Mohawk Industries
again, it will be forced to answer an immensely difficult decision that has the potential to run
against the legislative intent of civil RICO. As it stands, the plaintiffs in Mohawk have applied
for class action status, which would put potentially hundreds of millions of dollars in damages,
attorney’s fees and costs, and bad publicity at stake. Like Trollinger v. Tyson, Wal-Mart, and
Commercial Cleaners, Mohawk Industries will likely settle this lawsuit with a lucrative payout if
the Supreme Court does not take the case.
IV. CONCLUSION
RICO has been a controversial statute since its enactment more than thirty years ago.
Congress created the remedial statute to address the undesirable organized crime and mafia
presence in the United States and the inability for law enforcement to effectively resolve the
problem. Regardless of its initial purpose, RICO has developed, with the support of Congress,
into a broadly interpreted statute that holds those liable of clearly defined predicate offenses
liable to competitors, business partners, and most recently, employees for injuries sustained by
these criminal acts. This development has created widespread criticism of civil RICO’s
application to vulnerable deep pocket corporations where the damages easily swell into the tens
of millions of dollars. Civil RICO defendants consistently argue that the scope of liability under
RICO extends only to those involved in organized crime, as originally intended under the statute.
Nevertheless, congressional expansion of several predicate offenses through the late twentieth
century has shown legislative approval of broad application of civil RICO to private plaintiffs
that are injured by the defined criminal acts of the defendants that often go undetected by or
surpass the resources of governmental law enforcement agencies.
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Although the civil application of RICO can potentially open a litigation floodgate
because of its treble damages remedy as well as attorney’s fees and costs, this risk is
unsubstantiated. The statute includes a ‘by reason of” requirement, when applied as Congress
intended and in Mohawk Industries, that filters out inappropriate civil RICO suits with plaintiffs
outside the intended directness under the statute. The U.S. Supreme Court’s “direct proximate
cause” requirement in Anza, however, goes far beyond Congress’s intended limitations under its
liberal construction clause and RICO’s statutory development over the past twenty years. If
followed broadly, Anza’s decision would most likely eliminate virtually every civil RICO
lawsuit brought by a party other than the enforcement agency in charge of criminally prosecuting
the applicable predicate offense. This interpretation would frustrate the legislative intent to
allow private parties to act as “private attorneys general” to assist law enforcement in eradicating
illegal conspiracies that provide an unfair advantage over the injured party.
Civil RICO does not apply to the most directly affected party of the unlawful conspiracy.
Rather, civil RICO is intended to allow private parties to hold competitors, debtors, and
employers, among others, liable for unlawfully benefiting or profiting from a criminal act that
gave it an illicit competitive advantage. These private parties still are required to be directly and
proximately injured by the racketeering offense of the alleged conspiracy, but not the most
directly injured party.
To prevent limitless conflicting court decisions that usually take upwards to six years to
litigate, Congress should amend RICO to address the manner in which the statute has developed
in modern times. The amendment should address two key points most controversial during
litigation. First, it should clearly define who has statutory standing to bring a civil RICO claim.
The primary issue being whether it is the one most directly injured (Anza and Holmes direct
proximate cause) or a lesser requirement where the plaintiff only must show it was directly
injured (by reason of) from the unlawful activity. Second, although beyond the analytical scope
of this article, Congress should clearly define who could be sued under RICO to further limit
lawsuits that are beyond its scope. These amendments will simplify the civil RICO statutory
standing and direct proximate cause requirements, thereby permitting claims that assist in the
private enforcement of unlawful acts that are beyond the scope of law enforcement resources and
conversely eliminate claims that are beyond the statutory scope of the statute.
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